Is CONGRESS HANDCUFFING OUR COURTS?

INTRODUCTION

In 1996, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA

or the Act), I responding to public outrage over what is perceived as a
barrage of frivolous lawsuits filed by prisoners. 2 The purpose of the Act
is to curtail frivolous prison litigation by placing stringent procedural
steps on prisoners 3 who attempt to file civil actions 4 with respect to

conditions of confinement. Specifically, the Act deters prisoner litigation5
by (1) requiring that prisoners first exhaust all administrative remedies;
(2) barring a prisoner from filing further claims after three previously
filed claims are dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a

cause of action; 6 (3) revoking a prisoner's earned release credit for filing
1 Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 801, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996) (amending scattered sections

of 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
2 See 141 CONG. REc. S14626 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole).
Senator Dole stated that the amendment would put an end to "inmate litigation fun-andgames." Id.; Spencer Abraham, Tough on Crime? Not the Clinton Justice Department,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 1996, at A23 (noting that suits brought by prisoners in federal
courts are "often ludicrous" and come at a high cost to taxpayers).
In 1992, 26,824 prisoners' rights cases were filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CHALLENGING THE CONDITIONS
OF PRISONS AND JAILS: A Report on Section 1983 Litigation 2 (1994). Of these suits,

however, only 19% were dismissed as frivolous. See id. at 20. The most frequent reason for dismissal of the suits was the failure of the defendant to comply with court orders.
See id. Such failures included indigent prisoners' failure to pay filing fees or to respond
to court orders within the required time period. See id.
3 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(h) (West Supp. 1997). The Act defines a "prisoner"
as
"any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of,
sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and
conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program." Id.
4 Several United States courts of appeals have held that the term "civil action" in the
Act does not refer to habeas corpus petitions. See Santana v. United States, 98 F.3d 752,
753 (3d Cir. 1996); see also Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 76-78 (3d Cir. 1996)
(noting that civil action under the Act also does not apply to writs of mandamus). But see
Green v. Nottingham, 90 F.3d 415, 417-18 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that the PLRA does
appl, to writs of mandamus).
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(a).
6 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(g) (West Supp. 1997). The provision, however, does allow an exception in cases where the prisoner can prove he is in immediate threat of danger. See id.
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a frivolous claim; 7 and (4) allowing a court to dismiss sua sponte any
claim that fails to state a cause of action upon which relief may be
granted. 8 Many of these provisions represent a dramatic departure from
established Supreme Court precedence.
One of the central pieces of the legislation, however, does not deal
with the filing of frivolous suits, but rather restricts the ability of federal
courts to grant relief in prison litigation cases. The Act creates limitations on the power of a federal court to grant prospective reliefi° or approve such relief." The limitations are intended to eliminate judicial intervention in the correctional setting;
as such, they are applied
12
retroactively to existing court orders.
The PLRA was enacted primarily in response to state officials'
frustration with the federal courts controlling the management of the
prison system. 13 Since the Supreme Court first established that the judiciary has the power to hear the merits of a prisoner's claim and grant relief as needed, 14 federal courts have been responsible for ordering major
7 See id. § 1932.
1 See id. § 1915A(b).
9 Compare Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977) (recognizing
"that prisoners
have a constitutional right of access" to courts), and Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S.
249, 251 (1971) (declaring that inmates "are not held to any stricter standard of exhaustion [of remedies]" than other civil rights litigants), with 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(g) (barring
a prisoner from filing a claim once three previously filed claims are dismissed as frivolous), and 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(a) (requiring that prisoners exhaust all administrative
remedies).
10 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (West
Supp. 1997).
1 See id. § 3626(c)(1) (applying the provisions to consent decrees).
12 See id. § 3626(b)(1)-(3).
13 See 142 CONG. REc. S3703 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1996) (statement of Sen. Abraham)
(stating that prisoner lawsuits have resulted in "turning over the running of our [state's]
prisons to the [federal] courts"); 141 CONG. REG. S14626 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Dole) (detailing how the guidelines set by the PLRA will "restrain liberal Federal judges who see violations of constitutional rights in every prisoner complaint... [and use them] to micromanage State and local prison systems."); id. at
S14628 (statement of Sen. Kyl) (noting that the PLRA will assure that the states "regain
control of the Federal court system, and we do not just allow the Federal judges to dictate
to the States how their prison systems will be run"); see also Joseph Wharton, Courts
Now Out of Job as Jailers, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1996, at 40 (quoting South Carolina Attorney
General Charlie Condon who characterizes original court orders as giving "federal courts

'the power to micromanage our prisons'").

See Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 546 (1964) (per curiam). The
Court recognized
for the first time that a prisoner can assert a challenge to a state officer's conduct under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. See id. Although the decision does not discuss the issue at length, in
allowing the claim to proceed, the Court effectively signaled to lower courts that the

"hands-off' doctrine was no longer available.

See Dorothy Schrader, Prisoner Civil

Rights Litigation and the 1996 Reform Act, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH REPORT, No. 96468A, CRS-5 (1996) [hereinafter CONGRESSIONAL REPORT 1]; see also 1 RIHTS OF
PRISONERS 9 (Michael B. Mushlin ed., 2d ed. 1993) (indicating that the Supreme Court
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changes in the administration of correctional institutions.15 The ordered
changes have mandated specific prison reform measures 16 and in some
cases even required the release of inmates due to overcrowding.1 7 Negotiated consent decrees 18 between individual states and their prisoners have
implemented many of these changes. 19 Yet even consent decrees, which
are viewed as less costly and more expeditious than litigation,20require a
multitude of court orders to implement and enforce their terms.
explicitly "sounded the death knell to the hands-off doctrine" in the early 1970s). Previously, under the "hands-off" doctrine, courts declined to reach the merits of a prisoner's
claim. See Comment, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to
Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506, 506 (1963). Rather, the court
would refuse jurisdiction over any prisoner's claim that addressed the conditions of confinement. See id.
15 See Malcolm M. Feeley & Roger A. Hanson, The Impact of
Judicial Intervention
on Prisons and Jails: A Frameworkfor Analysis and a Review of the Literature, in
COURTS, CoRmnReONS, AND THE CONSTITrnON 12, 13-17 (John J. Diluio, Jr. ed. 1990)
(discussing court orders and the extent to which they have resulted in a restructuring of
institutional life).
16 See Campbell v. McGruder, 416 F. Supp. 100, 105-06 (D.D.C. 1975). The district court ordered that inmates be given at least an hour of outdoor recreational time; that
clean clothing, bed linen, and towels be provided at least once a week; and that a classification system be established to differentiate between high security-risk and low securityrisk inmates. See id. at 105; see also Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S.
367, 373 (1992) (ordering that the state "expend the funds reasonably necessary to renovate another existing facility as a substitute detention center.").
17 See Finney v. Hutto, 410 F. Supp. 251, 254 (E.D. Ark. 1976). The
court in Finney found that the women's reformatory was unconstitutionally overcrowded; thus the
court ordered the closing of the institution and either the transfer or the release of all the
inmates. See id.
15 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 410-11 (6th ed. 1990). A consent decree
is defined

as "[a] judgment entered by consent of the parties whereby the defendant agrees to stop
alleged illegal activity without admitting guilt or wrongdoing." Id.
See THE NATIONAL PRISON PROJECT, STATUS REPORT:

STATE PRISONS AND THE

COURTS 1-15 (Jan. 1, 1993) [hereinafter PRISON PROJECT] (detailing the various states that
have prisons operating under consent decrees and the changes those decrees have imposed); see also Gregory C. Keating, Note, Settling Through Consent Decree in Prison
Reform Litigation: Exploring the Effects of Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 34
B.C. L. REV. 163, 196 (1992) (noting that "inmates nationwide have utilized consent decrees... to realize improvement of confinement conditions."). Judges favor settlement
by consent decrees in prisoners' rights cases, in large part, because they eliminate the
tedious process associated with formulating an order and ensuring that it is implemented
and enforced. See BRADLEY STEWART CHILTON, PRISONS UNDER THE GAVEL 44 (1991).
Currently, prisons in at least 30 states are operating under consent decrees. See Keating,
supra, at 164.
See Komyatti v. Bayh, 96 F.3d 955, 957-58 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that although
consent decrees were adopted in 1992, the parties were still pressing contempt motions in
1996); Harris v. City of Philadelphia, 47 F.3d 1311, 1315 (3d Cir. 1995) (observing that
litigation surrounding the consent decrees has been ongoing since 1986); Benjamin v. Jacobson, 935 F. Supp. 332, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (explaining that litigation lasted from
preliminary negotiations in 1978 to a decision entered in 1996), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, No. 96-7957, 1997 WL 523896, at *1 (2d Cir. Aug. 26, 1997).
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Although court orders and consent decrees may be credited with
21 btassisting the overall improvement in the conditions of state prisons, both
have been met with general frustration and criticism. Opponents regard
court orders as "unnecessary judicial intervention and micromanagement
of [the] prison system." 22 Consent decrees are viewed with equal hostilterms,23
ity because prison officials are often unable to comply with their
and the decrees are seen as unwanted restraints left by previous prison
24
administrations.
This Note will focus on the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act that limit the relief federal courts may grant in prison litigation
cases. Part I provides an overview of these provisions. Part II explores
the effects the provisions may have on prison litigation and reform, and
Part III addresses the constitutional concerns presented by the new restrictions. Part IV concludes that the limitations on a federal court will
not only adversely affect prison reform, but will also threaten the independence and strength of the federal judiciary.
I. THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT
Federal legislators and state officials have viewed the extent of judicial intervention in prison litigation cases25 as an abuse of judicial
21 See Susan P. Sturm, The Legacy and Future of CorrectionsLitigation, 142 U. PA.
L. REV. 639, 670-72 (1993) (discussing the changes wrought by judicial intervention in
prison management, including increased standard of living, improved quality of medical
care, and decrease in prison violence). But see Feeley & Hanson, supra note 15, at 1721 (discussing the views of critics who denounce judicial intervention for its role in undermining institutional authority and consequently contributing to a decline in prison institutions).
142 CONG. REc. S3703, S3704 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1996) (statement of Sen. Abraham); see also Benjamin, 935 F. Supp. at 340-42 (discussing the legislative history of the
PLRA, particularly the vocal criticism of federal courts' intervention in state prison management).
See Keating, supra note 19, at 164-65 (noting that increases in prison population
often make it difficult for prison administrators to comply with consent decrees establishinggopulation caps).
See Clair A. Cripe, Courts, Corrections, and the Constitution: A Practitioner's

View, in COURTS, CoRREcnONS, AND THE CONSTMImON, supra note 15, at 268, 275.
Consent decrees seldom contain provisions that provide for changing circumstances. See
id. Prison administrators, therefore, often find themselves governed under decrees that
were once thought advantageous but are now no longer necessary. See id.
This frustration is understandable given the fact that the succeeding state administration was probably not a party to the original consent decree. See Implementation of Prisoners Rights Legislation, Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 104th Cong. (1996)
available in 1996 WL 10831581 (statement of Gov. John Engler, Michigan) (testifying to
the frustration of a subsequent administration that is bound to a decree the administration
itself did not adopt).
25 See CONGRESSIONAL REPORT I, supra note 14, at CRS-3. Prison litigation cases
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power. 26 Both groups have criticized the federal judiciary for its excessive involvement in the management of prisons through court orders and
consent decrees. 27
To curb this involvement, Congress limited the
remedies a federal court may provide in a prison litigation case. In addition, to ensure that current judicial intervention ceases, Congress provided for termination of all prior relief granted that exceeds the newly
enacted limitations.
A. Requirementsfor Relief
The PLRA places new restraints on federal court intervention 2s in
29
prison administration.
Previously, when addressing the conditions or
practices of a prison, federal courts, upon finding a violation of the
Constitution or federal law, intervened using the judicial powers of equity. 30 Under the guise of equity, broad remedial decrees were issued to
restructure the correctional facilities and eliminate any wrongdoing. 31
primarily involve prisoners who file civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging
unconstitutional conditions existing at the inmates' penal institutions. See id.
26 See Implementation of Prisoners Rights Legislation, Before the Senate
Judiciary
Committee, 104th Cong. (1996) available in 1996 WL 10831580 (statement of Sen. Orrin
Hatch, Utah) (declaring that "it had become clear that federal courts had gone too far in
exercising their equitable remedial powers to micromanage our nation's prisons"); id.
(statement of Gov. John Engler, Michigan) (accusing the federal courts of exceeding the
constitutional authority of the judiciary "[under the guise of enforcing consent decrees
entered without any finding of unconstitutional conditions").
See id.
28 But see 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(d) (West Supp. 1997) (not limiting the extent
of relief
state courts may provide
under state law claims).
3
62
6
29 See id. §
(g)(5). The PLRA defines prison as "any Federal, State, or local
facility that incarcerates or detains juveniles or adults accused of, convicted of, sentenced
for,30or adjudicated delinquent for, violations , of criminal law." Id.
See U.S. CONST. art. IIl, § 2, cl. 1. "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases,
in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority .... " Id. The Framers
intended this provision of Article III to vest federal courts with the power to adjudicate
cases where the particular facts "would render the matter an object of equitable rather
than legal jurisdiction, as the distinction is known and established in several of the
States." THE FEDERAUST No. 80, at 480 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
In Swann v. Charlotte-MecklenburgBoard of Education, the United States Supreme
Court declared that "[o]nce a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility
are inherent in equitable remedies." 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971). Federal district courts subsequently applied the holding in Swann when fashioning prison reform remedies. See
CHILTON, supra note 19, at 43.
31 See Campbell v. McGruder, 416 F. Supp. 100, 105-06 (D.D.C. 1975). Upon
finding that the quality of life at the correctional facility violated the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the district court ordered that the offending conditions be remedied. See id. at 105. To ensure compliance, the court also
ordered periodic prison inspections by various government agencies. See id. The court
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The resulting decrees were usually complex, containing detailed instructions on prison management, 32 necessary implementation schemes, 33 and
enforcement mechanisms .3
The PLRA narrows the previously available remedies that were
utilized to correct unlawful prison conditions. Under the provisions of
the Act, a federal court cannot enter or approve proscriptive relief 5 to
correct the violation of a federal right unless the relief is (1) narrowly
3
7
drawn, 36 (2) reaches no further than needed to correct the infringement,
and (3) provides the least intrusive means to correct the violation. 38 In
addition, when fashioning the appropriate remedy, a court must "give
substantial weight to any adverse impact [the relief might
39 have] on public
safety or the operation of [the] criminal justice system."
The PLRA revokes the power of federal district courts to relieve
unconstitutional prison overcrowding.
Previously, when prison over41
crowding rose to a level constituting cruel and unusual punishment,
federal courts remedied the situation by ordering the institution to transfer or release prisoners. 42 Under the PLRA, however, such an order
The Act further requires
may only be entered by a three-judge panel.
that a three-judge panel find by clear and convincing evidence that (1)
crowding is the principal cause of the infringement of the federal right"
then listed specific directives to be implemented in order to maintain constitutionallyadequate conditions. See id. at 105-06.
7 See id. at 106 (detailing the procedures to be followed whenever an inmate is restrained).
33 See CI-ILTON, supra note 19, at 53 (noting that it is common practice
for district
courts to appoint assistants or Special Masters pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 to oversee the implementation of court orders).
34 See id. at 55. Courts are empowered to enforce an order either through the
use of
contempt citations or by the retention ofjurisdiction in the matter. See id.
35 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(g)(7) (West Supp. 1997) (defining prospective
relief as

"all relief other than compensatory damages").
36 See id. § 3626(a)(1)(A).
37 See id.
38 See id.

39 See id.
40 See id.§ 3626(a)(3).
41 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.

The Eight Amendment states that "[elxcessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments

inflicted." Id.

42 See Finney v. Hutto, 410 F. Supp. 251, 254 (E.D. Ark. 1976) (ordering a correctional institution closed and its inmates transferred or released).
43 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(a)(3)(B) (West Supp. 1997). The new provision
requires
that the three-judge panel be appointed in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2284. See id.
Section 2284 provides that "the judge to whom the request is presented shall ... notify
the chief judge of the circuit, who shall designate two other judges, at least one of whom
shall be a circuit judge," to sit on the panel. See 28 U.S.C. § 2284(b) (1982).
44 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(a)(3)(E)(i).
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and (2) no other relief will alleviate the violation.45 Upon such a finding,
a prisoner release order may nonetheless be granted only if a prior, less
46
intrusive order, which allowed the defendant sufficient time to comply,

failed to remedy the violation. 47
In addition to narrowing the ability of a federal court to enter orders
in prison litigation cases, Congress sought to further restrain judicial intervention by restricting the power of a court to enforce consent decrees.
Oftentimes, as an alternative to litigation, parties to a prisoner

suit settle by negotiating a consent decree.

Generally, such a decree

imposes obligations on prison administrators that are similar to those prescribed under court order 50 and are equally enforceable. 51 A consent decree, however, may provide greater relief for prisoners while imposing
stricter obligations on prison administrators than those otherwise permitted under court order.
Although a consent decree may initially avoid
judicial involvement, court intervention53may ultimately be necessary in
order to enforce the terms of the decree.
The PLRA restricts judicial enforcement of a consent decree by
mandating compliance with the same limits imposed on a court when entering an order. 4 Thus, if the parties negotiate a settlement and wish the
45
46
47
48
49

See id. § 3626(a)(3)(E)(ii).
See id. § 3626(a)(3)(A)(ii).
See id. § 3626(a)(3)(A)(i).
See infra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
See Keating, supra note 19, at 163-64 (pointing out that in recent years, parties in
disputes against public institutions, specifically in the area of prison reform litigation,
have utilized consent decrees in order to resolve disputes).
so Compare Benjamin v. Jacobson, 935 F. Supp. 332, 342-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(discussing the terms of the consent decree negotiated by the parties), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, No. 96-7957, 1997 WL 523896, at *1 (2d Cir. Aug. 26, 1997) with Campbell v. McGruder, 416 F. Supp. 100, 105-06 (D.D.C. 1975) (discussing the provisions
of the court order entered by the judge).
51 See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 378 (1992) (recognizing
that although a consent decree is contractual in nature, it is reflected in, and enforceable
as "a judicial decree that is subject to the rules generally applicable to other judgments
and decrees"); see also Lloyd C. Anderson, Implementation of Consent Decrees in
StructuralReform Litigation, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 725, 725-26 (discussing generally the
contours of a consent decree).
52 See Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S.
501, 525 (1986). The Court declared that, although a consent decree "must further the
objectives of the law upon which the complaint is based," its legal force is animated by
the parties' consent. Id. Therefore, the Court concluded that "a federal court is not necessarily barred from entering a consent decree merely because the decree provides
broader relief than the court could have awarded after a trial." Id.
53 See, e.g., United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114 (1932) (using the powers of equity to modify an existing order to address changing conditions).
54 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(c)(1) (West Supp. 1997). The PLRA defines a consent
decree as "any relief entered by the court that is based in whole or in part upon the con-
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agreement to be subject to court enforcement, 5 the settlement must be
narrowly drawn5 6 and necessary to correct a federal right.57
B. Termination of Relief
In addition to curtailing the ability of federal courts to intervene in
prison administration through the use of court orders and consent decrees, the PLRA also provides for the termination of current judicial involvement. To this end, the PLRA creates a series of termination provisions that defendants in prison litigation cases may utilize to invalidate
court orders or consent decrees. 58 Prior to the enactment of the PLRA,
termination or modification of a court order or consent decree required
prison administrators to file a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which allowed a reopening of that prior judgment only in
very limited circumstances.5 9 Conversely, the PLRA allows considerably
broader standards to be utilized when ruling on a motion to terminate. 6°
The termination provisions of the PLRA provide for the automatic
termination of any court order or consent decree two years after entry of

sent or acquiescence of the parties but does not include private settlements."
Id. §
3 62 6
(g)(1).
55 See id. § 3626(c)(2)(A). The PLRA does not preclude parties from entering
into a
private settlement agreement as long as the terms of the agreement are not subject to
court enforcement. See id. An exception is made, however, for terms that allow for the
reinstatement of the civil proceeding. See id. Furthermore, the Act does not preclude a
party from filing a state law claim in state court for the breach of a private settlement
agreement. See id. § 3626(c)(2)(B).
57 See id. § 3626(a)(1)(A).
See id.
58 See infra notes 61-64 and accompanying
text.
59 See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). Rule 60(b) allows a court to reopen a judgment
in very
limited circumstances. See id. The rule states:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party
or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence
could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule
59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged,
or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
Id.; see also Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 378 (1992) (holding
that a consent decree is a court judgment subject to the provisions of Rule 60(b)).
60 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(b) (West Supp. 1997). The PLRA does not, however,
prevent a party from seeking termination or modification of a court order or consent decree under Rule 60(b). See id. § 3626(b)(4).
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such relief.61 Termination may be denied only where a court makes
written findings that the granted relief remains applicable and is no

broader than necessary to remedy the violation. 62 If such a finding is
made, and the motion for termination is denied, the motion can be re-

newed one year after the date of denial. 63 Further, states presently operating prisons under court orders or consent decrees may petition for
termination of those orders unless the record contains findings that satisfy
the Act's requirements. 6"
II. EFFECTS ON PRISON

LITIGATION AND REFORM.

The intended effect of the PLRA is to minimize federal judicial intervention in states' prison administration. 65 Opponents fear, however,
that the Act will not simply minimize judicial intervention but will end
the role litigation plays in ensuring that adequate conditions are main-

tained in correctional facilities.6 There is further concern that the termination provisions of the Act will result in the demise of prison reform already achieved through use of the courts. 67
Judicial intervention, as a result of litigation, provides oversight for

an institution that is, for the most part, without independent monitoring. 6s
61 See id. § 3626(b)(1)(A)(i).
62 See id. § 3626(b)(3).
63 See id. § 3626(b)(1)(A)(ii).
64 See id. § 3626(b)(2).
65 See supra note 13 and accompanying
text.
66 See Implementation of Prisoners Rights Legislation, Before
the Senate Judiciary
Committee, 104th Cong. (1996) available in 1996 WL 13104194 (statement of Mark
Soler, President of the Youth Law Center) (discussing the adverse effects of the PLRA on
the conditions of juvenile correctional institutions); Tom Terrizzi, Should Prison Consent
Decrees Be Vacated? No, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 22, 1996, at 38 (criticizing the PLRA as
"regressive legislation which slams the door to the federal court, making it difficult to
address the violation of basic constitutional rights"). See generally Greg Moran, Cruel
and Unusual, Where Does PunishmentEnd and Cruelty Begin?, SAN DIEOo UNION-TRm.,
Aug. 9, 1996, at Al (discussing the new Act in light of constitutional standards against
cruel and unusual punishment).
67 See Benjamin v. Jacobson, 935 F. Supp. 332, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (warning about
"what will happen to prisoners' rights and the conditions in our prisons as a consequence
of [the PLRA]."). After examining the changes in conditions of United States prisons
over the last 200 years, Judge Baer warned that the PLRA may hinder the progress
achieved. See id. at 338-40.
68 See Sturm, supra note 21, at 693. Currently, there is no professional organization
in the corrections field that provides effective oversight of prisons. See id. While the
American Correctional Association (ACA) has created standards for the administration of
prisons and is in the process of auditing state and local prisons to assess compliance, the
ACA's ability to pressure prisons to maintain adequate facilities is weakened by the Association's inability to sanction prisons for noncompliance. See id. at 694. The ACA is
not as effective as the threat of litigation in compelling prison administrators to maintain
adequate facilities. See id. In fact, prison administrators have reported seeking accredi-
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The involvement of the courts has thus aided in improving prison condi-

tions directly through the implementation of court orders.
Moreover,
such involvement has played a major role in exposing correctional facilities to general public scrutiny,70 which in turn has motivated meaningful
prison reform.
By concentrating on isolated incidents of unconstitutional conditions, the reform effort has also provided the impetus for

general improvements in the management of prisons.72
Yet, many of the more important institutional reforms have not resulted from court orders .7 Instead, consent decrees have played the
pivotal role in implementing improved standards.74 Currently, no less

than thirty states operate at least one state or local prison under a consent
decree.

Prisoners often use the potential of state liability resulting from a
lawsuit as leverage in persuading the state to adopt a consent decree.76
tation from the ACA simply to avoid litigation. See id.
69 See id. at 662 (discussing the profound impact of litigation on the organization
and
management of prisons). Case studies of correctional facilities have shown that litigationdriven court intervention has generally "improved the living conditions and practices in
the facilities at issue." Id. at 670.
70 See id. at 659-60 (discussing the manner in which prisons, prior to judicial intervention, operated as closed communities where living conditions remained hidden from
thegublic).
See M. KAY HARRIs & DUDLEY P. SPILLER, JR., AFTER DECISION: IMPLEMENTATION OF JUDICIAL DEcREns IN CORRECnoNAL SErnros 28 (1976) (noting that as a result of public awareness of prison conditions, the legislature faced less resistance when
addressing institutional problems and making necessary improvements).
72 See Sturm, supra note 21, at 663, 665 (discussing the role litigation has played in
fostering the internalization of professional norms by numerous state correctional institutions). Further, greater public scrutiny resulting from litigation has advanced better
training and management skills for those in control of a prison's administration. See id.
73 See, e.g., Benjamin v. Jacobson, 935 F. Supp. 332, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, No. 96-7957, 1997 WL 523896, at *1 (2d Cir. Aug. 26, 1997).
In Benjamin, the consent decrees contained detailed provisions addressing various subjects including building maintenance, garbage removal, pest control, and sanitation. See
id.
74 See Keating, supra note 19, at 196 (discussing the success of utilizing consent decrees in prison litigation cases); Note, The Modification of Consent Decrees in InstitutionalReform Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1020, 1020-21 (1986) (noting the prevalence
of consent decrees in areas concerning prison conditions, school desegregation, toxic
waste litigation, and the decentralization of public mental health institutions). See generally John Barlow Weiner, InstitutionalReform Consent Decrees as Conservers of Social
Progress, 27 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REV. 355, 369 (1996) (discussing the benefits of
using consent decrees in advancing institutional reform).
V See Keating, supra note 19, at 164.
76 See Anderson, supra note 51, at 726-27. In addition to avoiding time and expense,
defendants in a prisoner suit may be "more likely to comply with a [consent] decree"
than an order imposed by the court because the agreement will embody terms the state
assisted in formulating. See id. at 727. Furthermore, because a consent decree will embody the negotiated terms of the parties, defendants can ensure that the decree will not
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The negotiated settlement is advantageous to prisoners as the decree allows the inmates to obtain immediate, detailed relief governing the conditions of confinement."
Furthermore, through negotiations, prison
administrators and inmates are able to ensure that specific problems are

addressed, problems that might otherwise be overlooked by a federal
judge. 78 The particularized expertise of the parties thus allows for the
drafting of an effective consent decree. 79
Consent decrees are inherently more flexible than court orders, and
as such, they may provide broader relief than a federal judge could bestow on a prevailing litigant.8 0 In some cases, however, prisoners must
file contempt motions to enforce the terms of their initial consent decrees. 8 For example, in response to the contempt motions in Rufo v.
Inmates of Suffolk County Jail,8 2 the parties negotiated another consent
83
decree that established the Office of Compliance Consultants (OCC).
The OCC functioned as an independent monitoring unit that made occasional visits to the facilities at Rikers Island to insure that the provisions
of the decree were upheld 8 4

contain an admission of unconstitutional conditions, and thus, may avoid potential liability. See Harvey Berkman, Prisoners' Rights Lawyers Plan Attack on New Law, NAT'L
L .Ji May 20, 1996, at A14.
See Ted S. Storey, When Intervention Works: Judge Morris E. Lasker and New
York City Jails, in COURTS, CORREcTIONS, AND THE CONSTrTUTION, supra note 15, at

138, 154-55 (discussing the consent decree that resulted from negotiations between prison
administrators and inmates at the House of Detention for Men on Rikers Island). The
consent decrees that arose out of the Rikers Island negotiations were fifty-page documents
containing over 30 provisions concerning the following areas: "laundry facilities, possession and receipt of publications, procedures for cell searches, attorney visits, inmate
council participation, due process and programs for detainees in high security categories,
environmental health, law library, and lock-in/lock-out time." Id.
7 Cf Keating, supra note 19, at 164 (commenting that one benefit of consent decrees
is that "parties with expert knowledge in the area can tailor terms to their satisfaction in a
wa~gthat a comparatively inexpert court could not.").
See Anderson, supra note 51, at 726 (noting that the intimate knowledge of the
situation allows the parties to utilize "their own creative efforts [to formulate] a more
feasible and finely-tuned decree than can a judge.").
so See Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S.
501, 525 (1986) (holding that a court may approve a consent decree even though the relief contained in the decree is broader than what a court could have granted).
81 See Storey, supra note 77, at 158.
2 502 U.S. 367 (1992).
83 See Storey, supra note 77, at 159 (noting that the "OCC is not a creature of the
court," but rather a result of compromise between the parties).
See id. at 159-60. Utilizing the new PLRA termination procedures, New York
City filed a motion to terminate the Rikers Island decrees responsible for the creation of
the OCC. See Benjamin v. Jacobson, 935 F. Supp. 332, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, No. 96-7957, 1997 WL 523896, at *1 (2d Cir. Aug. 26, 1997).
The termination motion was granted, thereby eliminating the OCC. See id. at 358.
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Consent decrees are considered an attractive alternative in prison
litigation primarily for two reasons. First, as discussed above, the
flexibility of the remedies available allows for the concerns of the parties
to be addressed adequately.8 5 Second, the ability of the judiciary to enforce the decrees ensures that the stated remedies will be implemented . 6
In cases where the rights of prisoners are memorialized in a consent decree but later violated, inmates may file a contempt motion to seek enforcement of the consent decree's terms. 87 Alternatively, certain consent
decrees may provide prisoners further relief such as access to a grievance
committee.3 Regardless of whether a prisoner files a contempt motion
or has access to a grievance committee, the prisoner is assured that the
consent decree is enforceable to the same extent as a court order. 89
The termination provisions of the PLRA are expected to dramatically affect prisoners' rights under consent decrees by allowing states to
abandon their obligations set forth in those decrees.90 Indeed, termination of a court order or consent decree under the PLRA will not ensure
that the alleged wrongs have been fully redressed. 9 1 Prior to the Act, a
court, when entering an order, was not required to make a specific determination that the proposed remedy was the least intrusive method to
correct the violation.
Similarly, no such findings by a court were re-

85 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.

See Anderson, supra note 51, at 736 (noting that courts typically retain jurisdiction
over cases settled by consent decrees); see Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts,
467 U.S. 561, 574 (1984) (involving consent decrees that addressed equal employment

practices and contained a provision permitting the district court "to enter any later orders
that 'may be necessary or appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this decree'"). Even
in the absence of such a provision, a federal court would retain jurisdiction over the matter under the inherent powers of the court. See CHILTON, supra note 19, at 55; see Rufo
v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 378 (1992) (emphasizing that a consent
decree is "enforceable as, a judicial decree that is subject to the rules generally applicable
to other judgments and decrees.").
87 See, e.g., Carty v. Farrelly, 957 F. Supp. 727, 733 (D.V.I. 1997) (addressing
the
prisoner's motion to show cause why the defendants should not be held in contempt of the
settlement agreement between the parties concerning prison conditions).
88 See, e.g., Benjamin, 935 F. Supp. at 342-43.
89 See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of
consent
decrees in prison litigation).
90 Cf. Berkman, supra note 76, at A14 (expressing concern that the Act "makes it
easier for prisons to terminate court orders and consent decrees").
91 See Terrizzi, supra note 66, at 2 (denouncing the provisions of the PLRA that will
let "defendants off the hook, regardless of whether the unconstitutional conditions exist").
92 See Berknman, supra note 76, at A14. Berkman recognizes that prison
litigation
decrees, like most consent decrees, fail to contain specific findings of violations because
the settlement affords the plaintiffs relief while protecting prison officials from "potential
liability in damages suits from prisoners." Id.
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quired when approving a consent decree. 93 In addition, the approval of
such a decree was not conditioned upon a finding of a constitutional violation. 94 In fact, prison administrators usually premised their participa-

tion in a consent
decree on the stipulation that no state official would
95
admit liability.

Under the new provisions of the Act, a court must grant a termination motion unless specific findings in the record indicate that the relief is

necessary and narrowly drawn.

Furthermore, in connection with a con-

sent decree, a finding of a violation of a federal right is required.97
Thus, states will be permitted to forego further compliance with court orders or consent decrees without the burden of establishing that termination is warranted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). 98

Evidence of this problem is already exhibited in cases where states
have filed motions to terminate. 99 For example, in Benjamin v. Jacob-

son,1° the court granted a motion for termination of consent decrees under the PLRA on the narrow grounds that no findings of constitutional
violations were made on the record. 10 1 The court did so while overlook-

ing the plaintiff's contention that noncompliance continued to exist in the
areas of fire safety, maintenance, and sanitation.'02 Clearly, as exemplified in Benjamin, the adverse effects of the PLRA's termination provisions will dramatically increase as more states file motions to nullify
93 See id.; see also Wharton, supra note 13, at 40 (noting that "such findings
are
rarely made because prison officials fear that admitting wrongdoing will subject them to
liability for other claims.").
94 See Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S.
501, 525 (1986) (declaring that "the parties' consent animates the legal force of a consent
decree," and hence, the decree can provide relief broader "than the court could have

[otherwisel awarded.").

95 See Berkman, supra note 76, at A14 (noting that in order to avoid potential liability
in prisoner suits, defendants will not admit to the existence of unconstitutional conditio V. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(b)(2), (c)(1) (West Supp. 1997).
97 See id. § 3626(a), (c)(1). Section 3626(c) dictates that a consent decree cannot be
approved unless it satisfies the requirements for relief detailed in subsection (a). See id.
See Terrizzi, supra note 66, at 2 (criticizing the Act for allowing defendants to es-

cape liability while unconstitutional conditions persist).

99 See Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365, 369 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
2460 (1997); Jensen v. County of Lake, 958 F. Supp. 397, 399 (N.D. Ind. 1997); Benjamin v. Jacobson, 935 F. Supp. 332, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part No. 96-7957, 1997 WL 523896, at *1 (2d Cir. Aug. 26, 1997).
1
935 F. Supp. 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, No. 96-7957,
1997 WL 523896, at *1 (2d Cir. Aug. 26, 1997).
101 See id. at 357.
102 See id. at 342. Despite concerns over the anticipated effects of the PLRA on
prison conditions, Judge Baer felt constrained to uphold the constitutionality of the Act.
See id. at 337, 340.
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court orders and consent decrees. 1°3 Prisoner-rights advocates have attempted to prevent the enforcement of the PLRA through numerous legal
challenges, including arguments of constitutional dimension.104
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS

In an attempt to prevent the termination of court orders and consent
decrees under the PLRA, prisoners have posed several constitutional arguments to challenge the validity of the Act. 0 5 The prisoners have relied
on the Fifth Amendment's °6 Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses
to challenge the validity of the PLRA termination provisions. 10 7 The
primary argument utilized by PLRA challengers, however, contends that
108
the termination provisions violate the Separation of Powers Doctrine.
103

See Wharton, supra note 13, at 40 (stating that at least 10 states and the District of

Columbia had already filed motions to terminate).
104 See Berkman, supra note 76, at A14 (contending that "[e]verything from the
drafting to the constitutionality of the Act will be challenged").
105See Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365, 368 (4th Cir. 1996) (challenging 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3626(b)(2) as a violation of the Separation of Powers Doctrine, denial of equal protection of the laws, and deprivation of property without due process of law), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 2460 (1997); Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Sheriff of Suffolk County, 952
F. Supp. 869, 875 (D. Mass. 1997) (challenging the termination provisions as a violation
of the Separation of Powers Doctrine, a denial of due process of law, and an infringement
of the right to contract); Hadix v. Johnson, 947 F. Supp. 1100, 1102 (E.D. Mich. 1996)
(asserting the same challenges); Benjamin v. Jacobson, 935 F. Supp. 332, 343 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (arguing the same constitutional deficiencies), affid in part and rev'd in part, No.
96-7957, 1997 WL 523896, at *1 (2d Cir. Aug. 26, 1997); Hadix v. Johnson, 933 F.
Supp. 1360, 1365, 1369 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (challenging automatic stay provisions as a
violation of the Separation of Powers Doctrine and due process of law).
Several plaintiffs in the above cases have also defended the court orders or consent
decrees on non-constitutional grounds. See, e.g., Benjamin, 935 F. Supp. at 343
(challenging the new procedures for termination as a violation of the Rules Enabling Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (1982)).
106 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Due Process Clause declares that no person shall "be
derived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Id.
See Benjamin, 935 F. Supp. at 356 (challenging the PLRA as a violation of the
"vested rights" doctrine). The Supreme Court has declared that "[ilt is not within the
power of a legislature to take away rights which have been once vested by a judgment."
McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102, 123 (1898).
The PLRA has also been challenged as impairing the freedom to contract. See Benjamin, 935 F. Supp. at 356; see also National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka
& Santa Fe Ry., 470 U.S. 451, 472 (1985) (recognizing that federal legislation that arbitrarily and irrationally interferes with a private contractual relationship violates due process under the Fifth Amendment).
108 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. The Constitution establishes that "[tihe judicial
Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." Id. The Supreme
Court has interpreted Article II as reflecting the "intention of the Constitution that each
of the great co-ordinate departments of the government--the Legislative, the Executive,
and the Judicial-shall be, in its sphere, independent of the others." United States v.
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In cases where prisoners have raised these constitutional challenges,
courts have differed on the constitutionality of the PLRA termination
provisions. 109
In addressing the equal protection challenge, courts have concluded
110
that the termination and relief provisions are not unconstitutional.

Prisoner-rights advocates disagree, arguing that inmates' fundamental
rights of access to the courts are hindered by the additional burdens im-

posed by the Act.111 In response to these arguments, however, courts
have refused to acknowledge the merits of prisoners' challenges." 2
Instead, courts have applied rational basis analysis and upheld the
13

termination provisions of the Act. For example, in Plyler v. Moore, 1
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit declined to apply a strict scrutiny analysis because the prisoners were not members of a
suspect class

14

and no fundamental rights were implicated."

5

Utilizing a

rational basis analysis, the Plyler court was satisfied that Congress had a
legitimate interest in "preserving state sovereignty by protecting states
from overzealous supervision" by federal courts in prisoners' rights

Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 147 (1871).
109 See Plyler, 100 F.3d at 375 (holding that 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(b)(2), as amended
by the PLRA, does not violate separation of powers, equal protection, or due process
principles); Jensen v. County of Lake, 958 F. Supp. 397, 404-05 (N.D. Ind. 1997)
(holding same); Benjamin, 935 F. Supp. at 358 (holding same), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, No. 96-7957, 1997 WL 523896, at *1 (2d Cir. Aug. 26, 1997) (affirming the constitutionality of the PLRA but only if interpreted to constrict the federal court's jurisdiction
and not as annulling the decrees). But see Hadix, 947 F. Supp. at 1109 (holding that the
termination provisions of the PLRA violate the Separation of Powers Doctrine by instructing federal courts to reopen final judgments); Hadix, 933 F. Supp. at 1369 (holding that
the PLRA provision that allows for immediate termination of a prior court order or consent decree while the court considers whether the relief was properly granted encroaches
upon the powers of the judiciary and denies prisoners the right to due process of law);
Gavin v. Ray, No. 4-78-CV-70062, 1996 WL 622556, at *4 (S.D. Iowa Sept. 18, 1996)
(holding that "the termination provisions of the PLRA violate the separation of powers
principles inherent in the Constitution"), rev'd sub nom. Gavin v. Branstad, Nos. 963746, 96-3748, 1997 WL 434633, at *1 (8th Cir. Aug. 5, 1997).
110 See Plyler, 100 F.3d at 374 (holding that the Act satisfies rational basis analysis);
Benjamin, 935 F. Supp. at 354-55 (same).
See Benjamin, 935 F. Supp. at 352 (articulating that the Supreme Court has recognized that a prisoner has "'a right to bring to court a grievance that the inmate wished to
present.'") (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 116 S. Ct. 2174, 2181 (1996)).
112 See Plyler, 100 F.3d at 373; Benjamin, 935 F. Supp. at 352.
113 100 F.3d 365, 373 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2460 (1997).
114

See id.

115

See id. While recognizing that the right to access is a fundamental one, the court

disagreed with the plaintiffs' contention that the PLRA burdens that right. See id.
Rather, the court viewed the Act as affecting only the scope of the relief available, but not
the right to file an action. See id.

1997]

IS CONGRESS HANDCUFFING OUR COURTS

297

cases. 116 As such, the court concluded
that the Act did not violate the
17
rights.
protection
equal
prisoners'
Similarly, courts have dismissed the due process challenges brought
by prisoners under the Fifth Amendment.1 13 Prisoners have been unable
to persuade courts that the termination provisions of the PLRA violate
2° or constithe "vested rights" doctrine," 9 impair the right to contract,1
12 1
irrational.
and
arbitrary
is
that
tute retroactive legislation
Under the "vested rights" doctrine, courts have upheld the PLRA
by concluding that a consent decree is not a final judgment, and therefore, any rights thereunder are not "vested." 122 Thus, when a court
terminates a consent decree pursuant to the PLRA, there is no due process violation under the Fifth Amendment. 123 In response to the challenge
that the PLRA impairs contract rights under a consent decree, one court
upheld the Act by finding a rational basis for the impairment of the contract.1 24 Lastly, in addressing the argument that the PLRA operates ret-

116
117

Id. at 374.
See id. (recognizing that under rational basis scrutiny the government need only

establish "that there exists a plausible reason for the congressional action"); Benjamin,
935 F. Supp. at 352-55 (addressing the same challenge and agreeing with the Plyler
court's analysis).
118 See Plyler, 100 F.3d at 374 (dismissing the due process challenges
of the inmates
that the Act violated the "vested rights" doctrine and operated retroactively); Benjamin,
935 F. Supp. at 355-57 (dismissing a due process challenge to the PLRA under the
.vested rights" doctrine and the freedom to contract).
119 See Plyler, 100 F.3d at 374; Benjamin, 935 F. Supp. at 356. The "vested rights"
doctrine holds that when an action has "passed into [judicial] judgment the power of the
legislature to disturb the rights created thereby ceases." McCullough v. Virginia, 172
U.S. 102, 124 (1898). The doctrine is grounded in the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause because the rights created by a judgment constitute a property interest. See Benjamin, 935 F. Supp. at 356.
See Benjamin, 935 F. Supp. at 356-57. The Supreme Court held that the Due
Process Clause prohibits Congress from enacting federal legislation that arbitrarily and
irrationally impairs private contractual obligations. See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 470 U.S. 451, 472 (1985).
121 See Plyler, 100 F.3d at 375. Pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, legislation that operates retroactively must have a rational legislative purpose. See Pension Benefits Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 729 (1984).
122 See Plyler, 100 F.3d at 374. Whether a right is vested depends on whether the
judgment conferring the right is final. See id. The determination of whether a judgment
is final for due process purposes mirrors the analysis utilized under the Separation of
Powers Doctrine. See id.
123 See id.; see also Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U.S. 100, 107 (1947) (holding that
.regulation of future action based upon rights previously acquired... is not prohibited
by the Constitution.").
124 See Benjamin, 935 F. Supp. at 357 (recognizing that such a challenge to the PLRA
must "overcome a presumption of constitutionality" by establishing that the legislation is
arbitrary and irrational).
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roactively, another court found that the Act affects only prospective relief
and is therefore constitutional.'

The challenge brought under the Separation of Powers Doctrine has
proven the most successful in invalidating the termination provisions of
the PLRA. 12 6 Accordingly, this argument presents the most serious
challenge to the validity of the Act.127 The termination provisions pres-

ent a separation of powers concern because they allow a state to obviate a
finally adjudicated court order or consent decree. 12s
The separation of powers challenge relies on three arguments.

First, the termination provisions are a legislative act that requires the reopening of final judgments. 129 Second, Congress exercised judicial
power by creating a rule of decision for the federal courts. 130 Third, the
new limitations on a court's power to grant
relief unduly restrict the re13

medial jurisdiction of the federal courts. 1
A. Reopening FinalJudgments

Under the Separation of Powers Doctrine, Congress may enact legislation with retroactive application, but Congress may not mandate that a
court apply such legislation in a finally adjudicated case. 132 This prohi125

See Plyler, 100 F.3d at 375 (citing Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244,

273 (1994)). In Landgraf,the Court held that "[wlhen the intervening statute authorizes
or affects the propriety of prospective relief, application of the new provision is not retroactive." 511 U.S. at 273.
12 See Hadix v. Johnson, 933 F. Supp. 1360, 1369 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (holding
that
the termination provisions of the PLRA violate the separation of powers principles inherent in the Constitution); Gavin v. Ray, No. 4-78-CV-70062, 1996 WL 622556, at *4
(S.D. Iowa Sept. 18, 1996) (same), rev'd sub nom. Gavin v. Branstad, Nos. 96-3746, 963748, 1997 WL 434633, at *1 (8th Cir. Aug. 5, 1997).
See Berknan, supra note 76, at A14.
128 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(h) (West Supp. 1997).
129 See, e.g., Benjamin, 935 F. Supp. at 344; Hadix, 933 F. Supp. at 1367; see also
Chicago & S. Airlines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948) (holding
that "bjludgments within the powers vested in courts by the Judiciary Article of the Constitution may not lawfully be revised, overturned, or refused faith and credit by another
Department of Government."). If, however, consent decrees are not viewed as final
judgments for separation of powers analysis, then the "reopening" provision of the PLRA
would not be unconstitutional. See Plyler, 100 F.3d at 371 (acknowledging that "[a]
judgment providing for injunctive relief... remains subject to subsequent changes in the
law," and analogizing a consent decree to such a judgment) (citing System Fed'n No. 91
v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 651-52 (1961)).
130 See Hadix, 933 F. Supp. at 1366.
131See Benjamin, 935 F. Supp. at 350.
132 See Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (1 Dall.) 409, 411-12, n.t (1792) (holding
that revision and control of judicial judgments by the legislature or executive departments is
"radically inconsistent with the independence of that judicial power which is ve[s]ted in
the courts; and, consequently, with that important principle [of separation of powers]
which is [slo [sltrictly observed by the Con[sltitution of the United States."); Plaut v.
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bition, however, presumes that the judgment entered by a court is, in
fact, conclusive as to the rights of the interested parties. 133 As such,
whether the application of the termination provisions to consent decrees
violates the Separation of Powers Doctrine
depends upon whether a con134
sent decree constitutes a final judgment.
In confronting this issue, it is essential that a court address Plaut v.
Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 3 wherein the Supreme Court explained the
"reopening judgments" principle of the Separation of Powers Doctrine.136 In Plaut, the Court determined whether § 27A(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) 137 was unconstitutional because the section required a federal court to reopen a final judgment. 139
Congress enacted § 27A(b) in response to the decision in Lampf v.
Gilbertson.139 In Lampf, the Court declared that any § 10(b) suit must be
brought within one year after discovery of a violation or within three
years after the initial violation. 140 Section 27A(b) sought to overrule
Lampf by establishing a new statute of limitations period. 14 , The new
law applied the statutory term of each jurisdiction to § 10(b) claims filed
there rather than the time period established in Lampf.142 In addition, the
statute provided for reinstatement of any § 10(b) action that was commenced on or before June 19, 1991, and was dismissed as untimely under
Lampf.'14 3

Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1447, 1456 (1995) (recognizing that the "decisions

stemming from Hayburn's Case... have uniformly provided fair warning that
[reopening of final judgments] exceeds the powers of Congress.").

See Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697, 702 (1864) (holding that federal court

judgments are "final and conclusive upon the rights of the parties"); see also Plaut, 115
S. Ct. at 1457 (declaring that once a judgment has "achieved finality...
[it] becomes

the last word of the judicial department with regard to a particular case or controversy").

134 See Benjamin, 935 F. Supp. at 345. The court applied a two-part jurisdictional test

to determine whether consent decrees are "final" for purposes of separation of powers
analysis. See id.
The first part of the analysis determines whether the court has
"jurisdiction over the merits of the complaint." Id. The second part evaluates whether

the court has "jurisdiction over the remedial orders entered in the case." Id.
135 115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995).
136 See id. at 1453.
137 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988), 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-l(b) (Supp. V. 1994).
132 See Plait, 115 S. Ct. at 1450 (addressing whether the plaintifi's complaint that had
previously been dismissed under the rule announced in Lampf could constitutionally be
reinstated under § 27A(h)).
139 501 U.S. 350 (1991).
140 See id. at 364.
141

See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).

142

See id.
See id.

143
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The petitioner in Plaut commenced suit in 1987 as a result of events
that occurred in 1983 and 1984.1" The suit stalled in pretrial proceedings until June 20, 1991, when the district court, pursuant to the ruling in
Lampf, determined that the action was untimely filed, and dismissed it
with prejudice.145 The petitioner failed to file a notice of appeal within

the required period and the judgment became final. 146
Subsequently, because of the enactment of § 27ATb2 the petitioner
sought reinstatement of his previously dismissed suit.'
The district
court denied the motion for reinstatement on the grounds that § 27A(b)
was unconstitutional. 1" The United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit affirmed the ruling of the district court.1 49 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine whether § 27A(b) violated the Separation of Powers Doctrine. 150
The petitioner argued that § 27A(b) was constitutional because the
section did not require the reopening of a final judgment, and thus did

14
145

See Plaut, 115 S. Ct. at 1450.
See id. The district court's decision to apply the Lampf holding to the pending suit

was based on the holding of a Supreme Court case decided on the same day as Lampf.
See id. (citing James B. Bean Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 544 (1991)). The
Court in James B. Bean declared that a new rule of law must be applied to the parties in
the case that announces the rule, as well as to any cases pending on direct review. See
James B. Bean, 501 U.S. at 544.
146 See Plata, 115 S. Ct. at 1451 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2107 (1988)); Griffith
v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 321 n.6 (1987) (articulating the standard for determining the finality
of a criminal judgment). Section 2107 precludes an appeal from "any judgment, order or
decree in an action, suit or proceeding of a civil nature... unless notice of appeal is
filed, within 30 days after entry of such judgment, order or decree." 28 U.S.C. § 2107
(1988). Additionally, the Grifflh Court, in discussing the finality of a criminal judgment,
held that a judgment is final once all appeals are exhausted and either certiorari is denied
or the time for filing for certiorari has lapsed. See Griffith, 479 U.S. at 321 n.6.
147 See Plaut, 115 S. Ct. at 1451.
149 See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., No. 87-438 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 13, 1992).
149 See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 1 F.3d 1487 (6th Cir. 1993).
150 See Plaut v. Spendtuift Farm, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2161 (1994). The Supreme Court
had previously granted certiorari in another case to determine the constitutionality of
§ 27A(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. See Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 114 S. Ct. 1827, 1827 (1994) (per curiam); see also 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78j(b) (1988), 78aa-l(b) (Supp. V. 1994). In Morgan Stanley, an equally divided
Court affirmed the holding of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit that
§ 27A(b) was constitutional. See id. Because the decision in Morgan Stanley lacked
precedential value, however, the Plaut Court considered the issue anew. See Plaut, 115
S. Ct. at 1451 n.1.
The P/aut Court applied the rule set forth in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,
432 U.S. 63, 73 n.8 (1977). See Plaut, 115 S. Ct. at 1451 n.1. In Trans World Airlines,
the Court had reiterated the principle that a "[jludgment entered by an equally divided
Court is not 'entitled to precedential weight.'" Trans World Airlines, 432 U.S. at 73 n.8.
(citation omitted).

19971

IS CONGRESS HANDCUFFING OUR COURTS

301

not violate separation of powers principles. 15s In this regard, the petitioner proffered that the reference in § 27A(b) to "the laws applicable in
the jurisdiction... as such laws existed on June 19, 1991," only pertained to the time period set forth in the Lampf decision. 152 To bolster
this argument, the petitioner highlighted the well-established policy that
judicial construction of a statute determines the meaning of a statute both
before and after the court has rendered a decision.153 Although acknowledging the validity of the policy, the Court noted that fidelity to Lampf
would render § 27A(b) "utterly without effect." 154
In the alternative, the petitioner contended that § 27A(b) applied
only to cases pending in federal court at the time of the statute's enactment, and not to cases already adjudicated. 155 Reiterating that such an
interpretation would render the statute purposeless, the Court pointed to
the absurdity of reinstating pending suits.
The Court concluded that
"no reasonable construction" of § 27A(b) mandated the reopening of
suits already dismissed with prejudice under Lampf 157
The Plaut Court next analyzed whether reopening a final judgment
would violate the Separation of Powers Doctrine. 158 The Court articulated two types of legislative action that generally violate the doctrine. 159
The first involves statutes that "'prescribe rules of decision to the Judicial Department of the government in cases pending before it.'" 1 6 Such

151 See Plaut, 115 S. Ct. at 1451.
152 See id.
153

See id. The Court recognized the principle that the "'judicial construction of a

statute is an authoritative statement of what the statute meant before as well as after the

decision of the case giving rise to that construction.'"
Express, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1510, 1519 (1994)).

Id. (quoting Rivers v. Roadway

IM See id. at 1452.
155 See id.
156

See id. The statute declares that "dismissed causes of action... shall be rein-

stated on motion by the plaintiff."
added).

15 U.S.C. § 78aa-l(b) (Supp. V. 1994) (emphasis

157 See Plaut, 115 S. Ct. at 1452.
158 See id. Respondents challenged the statute on the grounds that it offended both the

Separation of Powers Doctrine and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See
id. The Court explained that the due process argument, "if correct, might dictate a similar result in a challenge to state legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. Thus,
the Court decided to consider first the separation of powers challenge as that argument

provided a narrower ground on which to decide the constitutionality of § 27A(b). See id.
159 See id. at 1452.

160 Id. at 1452 (quoting United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871));
see also United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 392 (1980) (reaffirming that Con-

gress oversteps its law-making authority when it grants a court jurisdiction, "while prescribing a rule for decision that [leaves] the court no adjudicatory function to perform.")
(citing Klein, 80 U.S. at 146).
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statutes, the Court recounted, are not given effect. 16 1 The Court did acknowledge, however, that Congress is permitted to amend the law applicable to a case on appeal.162 The second type of legislative action that
offends separation of powers principles, the Court articulated, is that
which vests the executive branch with appellate review of federal court
decisions. 163
Recognizing that § 27A(b) does not fall within the purview of either
of those legislative actions, the Court noted that the statute still offended
the Separation of Powers Doctrine.164 The Court commenced its discussion by observing that Article III confers upon the judiciary the power
and the du 7 to declare what the law is "in particular cases and controversies." ' The Court further noted that historical records indicate that
the Framers of the Constitution intended for the decisions of the judiciary
to be reviewed by superior courts exclusively. 166 The Court thus concluded that these two principles establish "that 'a judgment conclusively
resolves the case' because 'a judicial Power' is one to render dispositive
judgments."
The Court then declared that § 27A(b), by directing the
reopening of final judgments, violated separation of powers principles. 168
In reaching this conclusion, the Court determined that the original
dismissal of the petitioner's claim constituted a final judgment.169 The
Court stressed several factors that must be addressed when considering
whether a judgment is final. First, the Court observed that the finality of
a judgment by statute does not deprive it of constitutional significance for
separation of powers analysis. 70 Second, the Court refuted the conten,167

161 See Plaut, 115 S. Ct. at 1452.

162 See id. (citing Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 441 (1992)).
163 See id. at 1453. (noting that Congress cannot vest the Executive Branch with the
power to review Article III court decisions).
164 See id.
165 Id. (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
166 See id. at 1453 (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40
CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 905, 926 (1990)).
167 Plaut, 115 S. Ct. at 1453 (citing Easterbrook, supra note 166, at 926).
168

See id.

169 See id. at 1457.
170 See id. The Court addressed petitioner's argument that § 27A(b) of the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934 does not affect the finality of judgments any more than the
principle that a new law applies to cases pending on appeal. See id. Specifically, the

petitioner attempted to show that the difference between a case pending on appeal and one
finally adjudicated was merely statutory. See id. In this regard, the petitioner pointed to
28 U.S.C. § 2107(a) (1982), which provides a 30-day time limit to appeal a district court
decision. See id. The Court disagreed by drawing an analogy between the finality of a
judgment by statute and a benefit created by statute. See id. In neither instance, the
Court noted, is the statutory nature constitutionally significant for purposes of separation
of powers or due process analysis. See id.
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tion that a statute is constitutional if it reopens final judgments for a class
of cases rather than for an individual case.171 Third, the Court noted that
the finality of a judgment is not affected because the judgment was the
product1 of a judicially created legal rule rather than a rule created by
statute.

The Court also addressed the petitioner's argument that § 27A(b)
was analogous to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) and, thus, did
not violate the Separation of Powers Doctrine.1 73 The Court distinguished Rule 60(b), noting that the rule did nothing more than confirm a
court's "inherent and discretionary power. . . to set aside a judgment
whose enforcement would work inequity." 1 74 As such, the Court decided that Rule 60(b),175unlike § 27A(b), is not a legislative mandate to reopen final judgments.
In conclusion, the Plaut Court stressed that the finality of a judgment can only be determined by the law as it exists at the time the judgment is rendered.176 The Court explained that if the law allows a judgment to be reopened for specific reasons, then such a limitation is part of
the judgment, and "its finality is so conditioned." 177 The Court declared, however, that a law permitting a judgment to be reopened is17unconstitutional if enacted subsequent to the rendering of that judgment. 1
The PLRA implicates separation of powers principles because, arguably, Congress infringed upon the independence of the judiciary by re17 9 When adquiring a court to reopen a court order or consent decree.
dressing this concern in connection with a consent decree, it is essential
to understand the prior treatment of such decrees by the Supreme Court.
In Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail,'s° the Supreme Court articulated the standard that governs a motion to modify a consent decree
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).181 In Rufo, pretrial detain171 See id.
172 See id. at 1457.
173

See Piaui, 115 S. Ct. at 1460; see also supra note 59 and accompanying text

(discussing the provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)).
174 See Piaut, 115 S. Ct at 1460 (citing Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire
Co 322 U.S. 238, 244 (1944)).
1Y5 See id.
176 See id.
177 Id.
178 See id. at 1460.

179 See Wharton, supra note 13, at 40 (acknowledging that the PLRA "appears most
vulnerable on the ground that it breaches the separation of powers doctrine" as articulated
in Paui).
18D 502 U.S. 367 (1992), vacating as moot Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney,
No. 90-1441 (1st Cir. Sept. 20, 1990).
11

See id. at 372.
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ees and county officials negotiated numerous consent decrees in response
to a district court order enjoining the county from housing inmates at the
jail in light of conditions "repugnant to the constitution." 18 2 The provisions of the consent decrees included design plans for a new jail. 13 Subsequently, the consent decrees were modified by both parties in order to
expand the occupancy of the new facility.1s4
After initial construction began, a motion was filed by the county
sheriff seeking to modify the decrees to permit the "double bunking" of
detainees in response to both a change in the law'8 5 and an increase in the
number of inmates. 18 6 The district court denied the motion, declaring
that "[n] othing less than a clear showing of grievous wrong evoked8 7by
new and unforeseen conditions" justifies modifying a consent decree.'
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed
the judgment, 88 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. '89 The Court
began its analysis by agreeing with the district court and noting that a
consent decree is subject to the rules that generally apply to all judgments
and decrees. 190 The Court, however, rejected the standard utilized by the
district court to modify the consent decrees. 191
182 See id. at 374.
183 See id. at 375.

The new jail was "to include a total of 309 '[shingle occupancy

rooms' of 70 square feet ... arranged in modular units that included a kitchenette and
recreation area, inmate laundry room, education units, and indoor and outdoor exercise
areas." Id.
184 See id. at 376.
185 See id. The sheriff argued that the Supreme Court's decision in Bell v. Wolfish,
decided one week after the consent decrees were entered, provided a change in the law
justifying modification. See id.; see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 540-41 (1979).
See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 376 (1992). The sheriff
contended that an increase in pre-trial detainee population provided a change in fact not
previously anticipated. See id.; see also Bell, 441 U.S. at 540-41 (holding that "doublebunking" does not deprive pre-trial detainees of liberty without due process of law under
the Fifth Amendment).
187 See United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932) (plurality opinion).
In
enunciating the standard for modifying a consent decree and writing for a plurality of the
Court, Justice Cardozo directed courts to inquire "whether the changes are so important
that dangers, once substantial, have become attenuated to a shadow." Id. The Justice
further explained that individuals seeking modification of a decree must show that they
are suffering a hardship so extreme and unexpected that they can justifiably be labeled
"victims of oppressions." Id.
188 See Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, No. 90-1441 (1st Cir. Sept. 20,

1990)

189).See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 498 U.S. 1081 (1991).

190 See Rujb, 502 U.S. at 378. The Court acknowledged that although a consent decree "embodies an agreement of the parties and thus in some respects is contractual in
nature," it is "reflected in, and ...
enforceable as, a judicial decree." Id.
191 See id. at 378-79. Defendant was seeking modification under either Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) or 60(b)(6).

See id. at 378. Rule 60(b)(5) states that a court
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Justice White, writing for the majority, limited the stringent

"grievous wrong" standard adopted by Justice Cardozo in United States
v. Swift & Co.192 Specifically, Justice White distinguished consent decrees that involve "changing conduct or conditions and are thus provisional and tentative," from those that protect rights "fully accrued upon
to change." 193
facts so nearly permanent as to be substantially impervious
Recognizing that the consent decrees in Swift implicated protected
rights of a more permanent nature, Justice White concluded that the
"grievous wrong" standard could not apply to decrees that involved
changing conduct or conditions. 194 Rather, the Justice reasoned that the
burden of a party seeking modification of a consent decree requires only
a showing of a significant change in the factual conditions of the decree
or in the applicable law. 195
The Rufo Court clarified the standard a district court must apply
when considering modification of a consent decree under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b). Such clarification by the Court, however, did not
disturb the finality of a consent decree beyond the limitations imposed by
Rule 60(b). 196 As the Court later declared in Plaut, Rule 60(b) does
may relieve a party from a final judgment when "it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application." FED. R. CIrv. P. 60(b)(5). Alternatively,
Rule 60(b)(6) allows a court to terminate a final judgment when there is "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).
19See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 379; see also supra note 187 (discussing the Swift standard).
Rufo, 502 U.S. at 379 (citation omitted). Justice White emphasized that the Swift
standard "was not intended to take on a talismanic quality" and make consent decrees
virtually impervious to modification. Id. at 380. The Justice noted that Supreme Court
decisions since Swift have recognized the need for flexibility in administering consent decrees. See id.
194 See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 380. Justice White explained that when dealing with consent
decrees in prison reform litigation, the need for flexibility, coupled with a lenient standard
for modification, is of heightened importance. See id. This moderate standard is required, the Justice opined, because an institutional consent decree often remains enforceable for a substantial length of time while the prison governed by the decree undergoes
significant change. See id.
95 See id.at 384. The Court held that once the moving party meets this burden, a
court should consider whether the modification sought "is suitably tailored to the changed
circumstances." Id. at 383. The Court listed several examples of situations where modification should be approved. See id. at 384-90. First, Justice White explained that modification may be warranted when changes in factual conditions have made compliance
"substantially more onerous." Id. at 384. The Justice stated modification would "also
[be] appropriate when a decree proves to be unworkable because of unforeseen obstacles." Id. (citations omitted). Justice White clarified this distinction by explaining that
although the changed circumstances need not have been both "unforeseen and unforeseeable," the changes could not have been actually anticipated at the time the moving party
entered into the decree. See id.at 385.
196 See id. at 378-79 The Court explicitly held that a consent decree is "a judicial decree that is subject to the rules generally applicable to other judgments and decrees." Id.
at 378. The Court noted that, like all other judgments, a consent decree is subject to the
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nothing more than confirm a court's "own inherent and discretionary
power" 197 and thus is not a legislative mandate.19S
The termination provisions of the PLRA, however, represent a dramatic departure from the standard articulated in Rufo under Rule 60(b).1 99
While the finality of all consent decrees and court orders was always
subject to the conditions of Rule 60(b), 2° the PLRA significantly expands the ability of a party to seek termination or modification of a consent decree or court order. 20 1 Hence, under the Act, court orders and
consent decrees are subject "to a reopening requirement which did not
exist when the judgment was pronounced."2°2 Moreover, while the finality of a judgment may be constitutionally subject to certain conditions, 2 03 those conditions must exist at the time the judgment is entered
and cannot be retroactively applied. 20 4 Thus, the PLRA clearly conflicts
with the principle expressed in Plaut.20 5
B. Rules of Decision
The principle that Congress may not proscribe a rule prohibiting a
court from performing its adjudicatory function is also deeply rooted in
limitations of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b). See id. The Court only disagreed with the district court as to the standard applicable to consent decrees under Rule
60W. See id. at 378-79.
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 115 S.Ct. 1447, 1460 (1995) (citing Hazel-Atlas
Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 244 (1944)).
198 See id. The court recognized that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) "does not
imFose any legislative mandate-to-reopen upon the courts." Id.
See Hadix v. Johnson, 947 F. Supp. 1100, 1104 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (opining that
"[t]he PLRA completely re-writes the standard for modification in prison litigation, makinconsent decrees subject to the constitutional floor-in direct contrast to Rujb.").
See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County, 502 U.S. 367, 378 (1992).
W1 See infra Parts L.A and I.B for a discussion of the new provisions.
2 Plaut, 115 S. Ct. at 1460.
2W See id. The Court recognized:
The finality that a court can pronounce is no more than what the law in
existence at the time of judgment will permit it to pronounce. If the law
then applicable says that the judgment may be reopened for certain reasons, that limitation is built into the judgment itself, and its finality so
conditioned.
Id.
2D4 See id. at 1460, 1463.
2W See Hadix v. Johnson, 947 F. Supp. 1100, 1109-10, 1112 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
Upon noting that "the PLRA applies law to the consent decree at issue here that was
clearly not the law when it was entered into," the court declared the Act unconstitutional.
Id. at 1109-10; see also Gavin v. Ray, No. 4-78-CV-70062, 1996 WL 622556, at *4
(S.D. Iowa Sept. 18, 1996) (holding that consent decrees are final judgments subject to
the principles of Plaut, and as such, the PLRA is unconstitutional to the extent it violates
Plaut), rev'd sub nom. Gavin v. Branstad, Nos. 96-3746, 96-3748, 1997 WL 434633, at
*1 (8th Cir. Aug. 5, 1997).
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our jurisprudential history. 2 °0 This general principle, which necessarily
limits the power of Congress to legislate, was first articulated by the Su207
preme Court in United States v. Klein.
In Klein, the respondent brought suit to recover the proceeds 2of
08
property captured by the United States from confederate sympathizers.
Although the property was forfeited due to certain disloyal acts by the
respondent toward the government, the respondent was entitled to the
return of the property ursuant to a presidential pardon that evidenced the
While the case was pending on appeal from a
respondent's loyalty.
passed an act thatprohibCongress
respondent,
judgment in favor of the
•
.
•210
Conited a court from considering a pardon as evidence of loyalty.
versely, the act mandated that a court consider a pardon as conclusive
evidence of disloyalty.2 1 1
The Court invalidated the act by concluding that Congress had
"passed the limit which separates the legislative from the judicial
The Court opined that although Congress may control the
power. " 2
jurisdiction of the courts, it is prohibited from articulating other rules
213
that must be utilized by a court in adjudicating a case.
Klein is credited with formulating the principle that "Congress may
not prescribe a rule of decision for the courts to follow without any independent exercise of [its] judicial powers. " 214 Congress is nonetheless,
While variempowered to amend the law applicable to pending cases.
2o6 See United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 392 (1980) (articulating the
constitutional principle that Congress cannot force its interpretation of a law upon the federal courts in particular cases); see also Plaza, 115 S. Ct. at 1452-53 (recognizing the
principle as one of three that are deeply rooted in Article III).
M7 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
M8 See id. at 132. The property had been seized by the United States under federal
legislation that required the "forfeiture [of] all property of every kind, used or intended to
be used in aiding, abetting, or promoting the insurrection" of the confederate states. Id.
at 130. The act, however, did not completely divest the true owner of ownership rights.
See id. at 128. Rather, the government acted as trustee for those individuals later found
to be entitled to the property. See id.
M9 See id. at 128-29. An individual whose property was captured could later retrieve
thegroperty or proceeds thereof if the individual was adjudicated a loyal citizen. See id.
2
See id. at 129.
211 See id.
212 Id. at 147.
213 See Klein, 80 U.S. at 145, 146. The Court announced that when, as a result of a
legislative act, "the court is forbidden to give the effect to evidence which, in its own
judgment, such evidence should have, and is directed to give it an effect precisely contrai r,* the Separation of Powers Doctrine is violated. Id. at 147.
Benjamin v. Jacobson, 935 F. Supp. 332, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing United
States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 391-92 (1980)), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, No.
96-7957, 1997 WL 523896, at *1 (2d Cir. Aug. 26, 1997).
215 See Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 441 (1992).
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ous prisoners argue that the PLRA denies a court the power to decide in216
dependently the motion before it,
the Act has been interpreted by cer217
As such, the PLRA
tain courts as amending only the applicable law.
is viewed as merely revising the standards a district court must apply
when hearing a motion
to terminate a decree and is not viewed as direct218
result.
end
the
ing
Although the PLRA does not articulate explicitly the weight a court
must allocate to certain evidence, as did the act at issue in Klein, the
PLRA does affect the role of a court when adjudicating a motion to terminate a consent decree. 2 19 The Act does so by precluding a court from
considering specific factors, such as non-compliance by a state with certain terms of the decree, while requiring a court to give conclusive effect
to other factors, such as the absence of a finding of wrongdoing at the
time the decree was entered.2 ° To this extent, the PLRA usurps the exclusive role occupied by the judiciary in deciding substantive issues of

law

221

C. Restrictions on Remedial Jurisdiction
Finally, opponents of the PLRA have challenged the Act as an un-

constitutional restriction on the ability of a court to "vindicate constitu216 See Benjamin, 935 F. Supp. at 349.
217 See id. at 350.
218 See Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365, 372 (4th Cir. 1996) (concluding that the PLRA
"amends the applicable law and does not dictate a rule of decision."), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 2460 (1997).
219 Compare United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 129 (1871) (addressing
an act that mandated that a court consider a presidential pardon as conclusive evidence of
disloyalty) with 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(b)(2) (West Supp. 1997) (allowing a court to determine whether in fact the relief granted in the previous court order or consent decree satisfies the new requirements of the PLRA). See also Gavin v. Branstad, Nos. 96-3746,
96-3748, 1997 WL 434633, at *8 (8th Cir. Aug. 5, 1997) (stating that "[tlhe rule of Klein
does not apply [to the PLRA] because this is not a case in which Congress... has 'left
the court no adjudicatory function to perform.'") (quoting Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at
3922
See Benjamin, 935 F. Supp. at 357 (recognizing that where "the newly required
findings [are] not made" at the time the decree is entered, "[tihe language of the PLRA is
clear" and requires immediate termination of the decree), affid in part and rev'd in part,
No. 96-7957, 1997 WL 523896, at *1 (2d Cir. Aug. 26, 1997). The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit affirmed the constitutionality of the PLRA, but declared that the
termination provisions are only constitutional if "interpreted as simply constricting the
jurisdiction of the federal courts to enforce the Consent Decrees." See Benjamin v. Jacobson, No. 96-7957, 1997 WL 523896, at *1. As such, the court announced, the PLRA
cannot be interpreted "as annulling those Decrees." Id. (positing that "there is nothing to
prevent the plaintiffs from seeking enforcement.. . in state courts.").
221 See Hadix v. Johnson, 933 F. Supp. 1360, 1366 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (concluding
that, "[ti h rough the stay provision, Congress automatically grants the movants relief, albeit temporarily, with no provision for a case-by-case determination.").
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tional rights" effectively. t = The Supreme Court, however, has never
indicated that Congress is limited in its authority to restrict the jurisdiction of Article III courts. 2 3 In several cases, the Court has explicitly
held that Congress does have the power to withhold or restrict the jurisdiction of an Article III court. 224 Therefore, the limits imposed by the
PLRA on the power of courts to provide equitable relief to 9soners fall
within the purview of Congress's authority under Article III.
IV. CONCLUSION

Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 to provide an answer to one of the most drastic problems in today's legal system-prisoner suits. 22 6 One cannot deny that as a result of the significant
227
number of prisoner suits filed annually,
federal courts are extensively
involved in prison management. 2n Although the PLRA may successfully
terminate judicial involvement, the question still remains whether the Act
presents the proper solution. If the purpose of enacting the PLRA was
solely to terminate any and all judicial intervention, then the Act successfully accomplishes this goal. If the primary concern was to maintain
prison conditions at acceptable standards, however, then it is apparent
that the PLRA fails. The Act fails because it does not ensure that conditions are constitutionally adequate when judicial intervention is terminated. This failure is evident from the cases terminating decrees under
the Act, where the only concern federal courts must address is whether
Benjamin, 935 F. Supp. at 350.
Cy. Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943) (addressing the constitutionality
of a statute that placed jurisdiction over claims under the Emergency Price Control Act in
the Emergency Court and stripped all other federal and state courts of that jurisdiction).
In Lockerty, the Court held that "[tihe Congressional power to ordain and establish inerior courts includes the power 'of investing them with jurisdiction either limited, concurrent, or exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction from them in the exact degrees and
character which to Congress may seem proper for the public good.'" Id. (citations omitted); see also Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330 (1938) (recognizing that
"[tihere can be no question of the power of Congress thus to define and limit the jurisdic-

tion of the inferior courts").
224 See Lockerty, 319 U.S. at 187; Lauf, 303 U.S. at 330.
25 See Benjamin, 935 F. Supp. at 351.
2W See Dorothy Schrader, Prison Litigation Reform Act:

An Overview, CoN-

GRESSIONAL RESEARCH REPORT, No. 96-513 A, CRS-2 (1996) (discussing the explosion in
prisoner civil rights litigation in the last 25 years and the strain such litigation has placed

on the judicial system).

227 See CONGRESSIONAL REPORT I, supra note 14, at CRS-1 (noting that prisoners' civil
suits constitute 17% of federal district court civil cases and 17% of federal civil appeals).
228 See PRISON PROJECT, supra note 19, at 1 (detailing the various court orders and
consent decrees governing state prisons). Currently, at least 30 states have one or more

prisons that are under the control of a federal court as a result of either a court order or
consent decree. See id.
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the relief granted was the minimal relief required. Upon a finding that
the relief was not narrowly tailored, the PLRA requires immediate termination. 22 9 Accordingly, there is serious concern that prison conditions
will regress to their previous unsupervised state. 23 °
Even if this predicted regression does not occur, many2Rre-existing
conditions already threaten the health and safety of inmates.
It is precisely these conditions that may not be properly addressed through the
limited relief available to federal courts. Moreover, the inability of the
federal judiciary continuously to oversee a prison presents a serious
threat to the discovery of unconstitutional conditions. Although such
concerns may be easily disregarded because of the individuals affected, it
is important to note that the law that governs the incarceration of an individual indeed "represents the pathology of civilization."=
Finally, the PLRA deals a heavy blow to the principles of democracy that govern our nation. Numerous Supreme Court decisions have
recognized the separation of powers principle by prohibiting any one
branch of government from asserting powers not granted to it by the
Constitution.
The PLRA constitutes a direct attack on this sacred
principle. As Article Ill stipulates, "[t]he judicial Power of the United
States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts
as the Congress may ...establish. " m4 Federal courts exercised this judicial power when granting relief by either court order or consent decree
to prisoners who challenged institutional conditions. In response, Congress, unsatisfied with the relief granted, has utilized the PLRA to deny
enforcement power to judgments the judiciary has already deemed equitable.

See Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365, 372-73 (4th Cir. 1996) (failing to consider

whether the previously-entered relief was mandated by principles of equity), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 2460 (1997); Benjamin, 935 F. Supp. at 357 (recognizing that inquiry is not
made into whether the terms of the consent decrees have been satisfied by the defen-

dants).

230 See generaly SAMUAL WALKER, POPULAR JuSTICE (1980) (discussing the history
of~prisons and incarceration from Colonial times through the twentieth century).
See Sturm, supra note 21, at 687-88. The author notes that in cases where prisons

lack vigorous judicial supervision, "little progress toward achieving and developing systems for maintaining constitutional conditions has occurred." Id.
232 LAWYER'S WIT AND WIsDoM 27 (Bruce Nash et al. eds., 1995) (quoting Morris
Cohen, Russian-born American philosopher, who said "[tlhe criminal law represents the
pathology of civilization.").
233 See THE FEDERALIST No. 9, at 72-73 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (noting that the system of separated powers in the government is a "powerful
mean[I, by which the excellencies of republican government may be retained and its imperfections lessened or avoided.").
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In so doing, Congress has disturbed the principles of Article III as
well as the Supreme Court cases interpreting those principles. Moreover,
Congress has undermined our faith that the laws will protect those individuals who need its protection most-the minority. While the other two
branches of government answer to constituents, the judiciary answers
only to the Constitution, the laws thereunder, and the principles of justice. It is the judiciary, therefore, that protects an individual's rights and
grants him or her relief when all else has failed. By restricting the ability
of prisoners to obtain judicial relief, the PLRA will assuredly prove to be
ineffective in maintaining adequate prison conditions. Perhaps more
disturbing, the PLRA may well destroy, or at least irreparably injure,
faith in a government that was designed to prohibit tyrannical rule over
all classes.
Ricardo Solano Jr.

235 C. FYODOR DOSTOYEVSKY, THE HOUSE OF THE DEAD 181 (C. Garnett
trans. 1957)

(warning that "[tjyranny is a habit [that] ...
into a disease.").

may develop, and it does develop at last,

